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There are various ways to evaluate the credit risk of a public company using both 
market data as well as accounting data. This paper focuses on applying two structural 
models, Merton (1974) and Leland (1994), to access the default risk of a public 
company, Thomas Cook Group plc. With estimated default probabilities higher than 
90% during 2011 to 2012, it is shown that both models can predict bankruptcy, which 
is in the form of debt restructuring and capital refinancing in early 2013. The Leland 
model also suggests that there exists an optimal capital structure that could minimize 
the credit spread. 
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The value of a firm could have considerably significant impact on its credit risk. In a 
simplified corporate capital structure, the firm asset is normally contributed by equity 
and liabilities, while the returns to each of the components can be decomposed into 
risk-free rate of return and risk premium. Defined as the difference between the yield 
of corporate bond and that of treasury-bill which is considered “risk-free”, the yield 
spread of a straight (option-free) bond is determined by liquidity risk, credit risk and 
interest rate risk. Thus a change in credit risk would alter the cost of debt, and thereby 
affect the cost of capital and capital structure for the future. 
In the event of default, the company fails to meet the either the coupon or principal 
repayments of the obligations, and then the process of bankruptcy is triggered, 
meaning that the investors could only gain back a portion of their initial investments. 
Worse still, creditors may be required to pay the salaries and other service fees to the 
lawyers and accountants before they could claim the remaining asset of the firm. 
Hence, even though companies that actually bankrupt are of a relative small portion in 
the real corporate world, bond investors are concerned about credit risk and default 
probability. 
Currently there are numerous ways to measure the enterprise credit risk, including 
qualitative assessment tools such as the concept of 5 Cs (Capacity, Capital, 
Conditions, Character and Collateral), and quantitative tools which measure the 
likelihood of default and price default risks, such as the reduced-form approach, 
which uses intensity-based models to estimate stochastic hazard rates. Also, standing 
somewhat in between, are rating agency grades, which usually are judgemental 
assessments of both qualitative and quantitative factors.  
For decades academics have been trying to measure and price credit risk by 
constructing structural models, among which Merton (1974) is the most widely 
applied and studied. By modelling the stochastic evolution of the firm value, 
structural models value the default risk and price the corporate debt. Based on the 
Black-Scholes option-pricing formula, Merton (1974) prices the equity as though it 
were a call option with the strike price which is the book value of the liabilities. The 
Merton model is a milestone in the development of such models, and since then 
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various models have been constructed by resolving the naive assumptions of the 
Merton model and by adding additional boundary conditions.  
Assuming that default is triggered at the first time at which the firm value falls below 
a certain threshold which need not be the book value of debt, Leland (1994) shows 
how such threshold could be determined. Incorporating tax benefit and bankruptcy 
cost of debt, Leland assumes that bankruptcy could be a policy to maximize the value 
of equity. Extending the idea of Leland (1994), Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) 
shows debt renegotiations could eliminate agency cost and bankruptcy cost, which is 
beneficial to several parties of stakeholders. It is suggested that the structural models 
could favour the financial decision making process. 
By performing a detail analysis of a chosen firm using the Merton model and the 
Leland model, this paper compares the results and reconciles the differences to 
examine the validity and accuracy of these two models in forecasting bankruptcy. The 
empirical findings show that both models display consistent results of the default 
probability and credit spread of the firm. In a further sensitivity analysis of some of 
the variables of the models, it is found that under the structure of Leland model, there 
is an optimal capital structure that could minimize the credit spread if maintaining the 
price value. 
The paper is structured as follow. Section 2 reviews the literature of credit risk, major 
bankruptcy prediction models and their empirical evidences. Section 3 is a financial 
analysis of the target firm, Thomas Cook Group plc, using accounting data as well as 
market data. Section 4 displays the implementation of Merton model and Leland 
model to the target firm and the analytical results, including a sensitivity test. Section 
5 concludes. 
2 Literature Review 
2.1 Credit Risk and Credit Spread  
A company defaults when it fails to meet its obligations. The probability of default is 
then described as credit risk. Bai et al. (2011) summarize the characteristics of credit 
risks as non-symmetry, cyclicality, non-systematic and infectiousness. Since 
structural models are to predict probability of default, inputs of such models may 
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provide knowledge about the determinants of credit spread. On the other hand, 
identifying the sources and drivers of default risk could help better evaluate the 
performance of these models.  
Traditionally the sources of risk could be categorised as systematic and non-
systematic, that is, the credit risk determinants could be divided into macroeconomic 
and firm-specific factors. Bonfim (2008) argues that firm-specific factors could 
provide better assessment of credit risk when macroeconomic factors were taken into 
account, which is in line with Tang and Yan (2010), who also concluded that the most 
important credit risk determinant at the firm level is implied volatility and that at the 
market level is investor sentiment. 
It is documented that default probabilities vary in different stages of business cycle, 
i.e. credit spread is counter-cyclical. Tang and Yan (2010) hypothesize that credit 
spreads widen during recessions and narrow during economic expansions. They also 
argue that the investor sentiment is a dominant source of credit risk at the market 
level. With some statistical analysis, Yamachi (2003) finds that the market price of 
risk is high at times of high risk, concluding that the risk tolerance of investors had an 
impact onto the credit spreads. This is consistent with the idea that during recessions 
investors are more risk-averse and thus ask for higher compensation for bearing credit 
risk. 
Elton et al. (2001) try to explain why a risk premium exists in corporate bonds and 
conclude that the major portion of the difference is the compensation for bearing 





influence the credit risk. This is in line with Vassalou and Xing (2004) that study the 
effect of default risk on equity returns, concluding that default risk is systematic and 
is priced into the excess stock return. Indeed, Fama and French (1996) argued that 
SMB and HML are financial distress related proxies. Adding an aggregated survival 
measure into the regression model of excess stock return against excess market return,  
Vassalou and Xing (2004) show that SMB and HML share common information with 
                                                 
1
 SMB stands for “Small minus Big”, which is the yield spread between small-capitalization companies 
and large-capitalization companies. 
2
 HML stands for “High minus Low”, which is the yield spread between value and growth stocks. 
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survivorship, but SMB has little pricing power. Interestingly, Schaefer and Strebulaev 
(2008) also include the FF factors in their examination of credit spread variables and 
find that the corporate bond returns are considerably sensitive to SMB. Despite the 
previous empirical evidence, how such systematic factors play a role in the 
determination of credit spreads remains unclear. 
Contrary to the findings of Elton et al. (2001), using the cross-sectional data on 
corporate yield spreads, King and Khang (2000) find that the bond sensitiveness to the 
equity market provides very limited explanatory power once the default-related 
factors are controlled for. One reason for this controversy is that the different choices 
of proxy are not empirically justified and thus may yield different results. Huang and 
Huang (2003) question the rationale of Elton et al. (2001), in that the expected default 
loss does not substantially represent credit spread. The expected default loss rate may 
be systematic, while credit risk premium, which is also a component of credit spread, 
is subjected to firm-specific information. 
Most of the firm-specific factors for credit risk, however, are intuitively indicated in 
the structural models. So far the most comprehensive research of the determinants of 
credit spreads is Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001). Overall they find these variables of 
statistical and economic significance but little explanatory power to the credit spread 
changes. The possible determinants and their intuition are as follows: 
1. The level of risk-free rate is negatively related to credit spread, consistent with 
the empirical findings of Longstaff and Schwartz (1995). Collin-Dufresne et al. 
(2001) also find that the sensitivity of risk-free rate increases as the firm 
moves towards bankruptcy. 
2. The term structure of yield curve is also negatively related to credit spread. 
Since an upward-sloping term structure implies higher future spot rates, the 
negative relationship is reasonable given the previous argument. Moreover, 
the downward-sloping term structure may imply economic recession, during 
which the credit spread would increase. However Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) 
find its influence of economic significance. 
3. Implied volatility is positively associated with the credit risk. As the structural 
models model the securities as options, higher stock market volatility would 
lead to larger credit spreads, and implies higher risk-aversion and default 
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probability (Yamachi 2003). In a further univariate regression analysis Collin-
Dufresne et al. (2001) find that a given increase in volatility would affect the 
credit spreads more proportionately than an equal decrease. 
4. Leverage is positively related to credit spread. Furthermore, higher leverage 
ratios would decrease return on equity, which could also widen the credit 
spreads.                            
5. Expected downward jumps in the firm value and the credit spread have a 
positive relationship. This is motivated by the volatility smiles in the observed 
option prices, which the Black-Scholes option pricing formula fails to capture. 
Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) find that with increasing market expectation of 
negative jumps, the credit spreads would expand.  
6. The expected recovery rate is negatively associated with the default 
probability. The recovery rates are indicators for the overall economic 
conditions and business climate. Taking the S&P 500 returns as proxy, both 
Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) and Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008) find it 
statistically and economically significant. 
In addition to the determinants tested in Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Schaefer and 
Strebulaev (2008) and Yamachi (2003), studies suggest there are missing firm-
specific factors that affect the credit spreads. Ogden (1987) and Vassalou and Xing 
(2004) suggest the size effect is an additional default-related variable. Corporate and 
personal taxes may also influence the credit spread in that the firms may or may not 
fully exploit the tax benefit (Lyden and Saraniti 2001; Qi et al. 2011). Yamachi (2003) 
quotes Schmid (2002) that liquidity may be a determinant but find little supportive 
evidence.  
2.2 The Evolution of the Structural Models  
There has been much literature trying to value securities without an active trading 
market or public available information to obtain the directly observable price. Merton 
(1974) is the very first model to “structure” the firm value and the economic process 
leading to default. Briefly, in a risk-neutral world, the Merton model uses the Black-
Scholes option pricing formula to price the equity of the firm as a call option which 
could be exercised at the book value of liabilities, and describe the dynamics of firm 
value as a stochastic process. The value of corporate debt is calculated as the firm 
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value deducted by the previous call option. Alternatively, the liabilities could be 
viewed as the short position of a put option plus safe assets. A detailed methodology 
of the Merton model is discussed in section 4.1.1. 
On pricing the corporate debt, Merton (1974) assumes that: a) the market is perfect 
and frictionless; b) assets are traded continuously in time; c) the Modigliani-Miller 
theorem holds; d) the yield curve is flat; and e) the firm asset returns follow a 
geometric Brownian motion. Based upon these assumptions, the Merton model could 
be used to price single-issued, zero-coupon risky debt, on the condition that there is 
no dilute payment prior to maturity. Upon maturity, once the asset value falls below 
the book value of debt, default is triggered, resulting in bondholders taking control of 
the firm and equity holders receiving nothing. 
As the assumptions of Merton (1974) are naive and restrictive compared to what are 
observed in reality, scholars raise newer models to resolve these assumptions, and 
bring modifications and complications to varied situations. Geske (1977), for instance, 
adjusts the Merton model to multiple maturity dates and modifies the boundary 
conditions to asset dilution, i.e. either debt or equity refinancing.  
A flow of literature is to relieve the assumptions that default can only occur on 
maturity date, i.e. default could occur prior to maturity. Also, the assumption of 
perfect anti-dilution is resolved, that is, coupon payments could be refinanced by 
issuing equity. 
Black and Cox (1976) is an instance, introducing the idea that default would occur if 
the firm value falls below a pre-specified level, rather than after the firm assets have 
been exhausted. Since such bond indentures as net-worth covenants, subordination 
agreements and restrictions on dividend payments could be served as a time-
dependent default boundary, the claims on assets may behave differently and then the 
securities are priced accordingly. 
Following Black and Cox (1976), Leland (1994) argues that bankruptcy is determined 
endogenously and thereby alters the bankruptcy-triggering conditions of the firm and 
time horizon of the bonds in his model. Assuming that the corporate bonds have 
infinite life and constant coupon payment, the Leland model includes the tax shield 
value and bankruptcy cost into the total value of the firm and shows how the default 
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threshold could be determined in such setting. Detail application of the Leland model 
is discussed in section 4.1.2. 
The structural models then become an integral part of corporate finance and corporate 
governance. Leland and Toft (1996) show how the bankruptcy could be determined 
and severed as the optimal decision made in the benefit of equity holders, assuming 
that the firm can actively choose the amount and maturity of debt. Contrary to 
Lonstaff and Schwartz (1995), the model presumes a non-stochastic process for 
interest rate to simplify the model, and relates the bond values to a group of variables, 
namely, firm value, asset volatility, leverage, bankruptcy cost, tax rate, payout ratio as 
well as default-free interest rate. 
As documented in empirical evidences, there is a certain portion of risk premia in the 
event of bankruptcy settlement observed in the actual security market that could not 
be captured by the Merton model. Leland and Toft (1996) also point out that long-
term debt could take advantage of a tax shield, but may raise the problem of agency 
cost of debt and asset substitution. Arguing that such high default premia in junior 
claims is caused by strategic persuasion and bargaining of equity holders to 
bondholders, Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) propose formulae to value equity and 
debt with the assumptions that there is no tax advantage to debt and the debt is 
perpetual. The Mella-Barral and Perraudin model shows how the bankruptcy cost and 
agency cost of debt could be reduced or eliminated by the renegotiation of debt 
between the two counterparties. 
Suggested by Jones et al. (1984) and Ogden (1987) that stochastic interest rates could 
help improve the predictive accuracy, the Merton model is extended to two-factor 
models. Resolving the assumptions of constant interest rate and simple bond issue, 
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) extend Black and Cox (1976) to a two-factor model 
with non-flat credit spreads. By incorporating both default risk and interest rate risk, 
this model allows for the firm assets being correlated with the interest rates and the 
default-free interest rates following a stochastic process. Taking a step forward, with 
the evidence that companies may rebalance the debt levels in response to changes of 
firm value so as to target some favourable capital structure, Collin-Dufresne and 
Goldstein (2001) propose a model with stochastic interest rates that captures the 
mean-reversion of leverage ratios. They show that the model is more consistent with 
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the empirical observation that the leverage ratio of the firm is stationary and that the 
yield curve of speculative corporate bonds is upward-sloping.  
2.3 Empirical Evidence  
Without empirical tests, choosing the most applicable models may remain a difficult 
task. However less effort has been made so far to empirically examine the structural 
models comparing to that of constructing theoretical foundations. This part of 
literature review will focus on three questions: 
1. How informative are these structural models? 
2. To what extent can each structural model explain the variation of credit 
spreads? 
3. Are the models robust, i.e. are there any inputs missing in these models? 
Although the results of empirical tests are conflicting, generally the studies show that 
these structural models can provide considerable amount of information for credit 
rating and the variations in credit risk. In a simple sign test of default presented in 
Jones et al. (1984), the contingent claims model significantly outperform the naive 
accounting-based model. 
Delainedis and Geske (2003) find that both Merton model and Geske model do well 
in forecasting credit migration. They calculate series of monthly risk-neutral default 
probability (RNDP) with the two models for the period of 1988 to 1999 and then 
examine the variation of these default probabilities prior to default or credit migration 
on both ex-post and ex-ante bases. At the event window, the difference between the 
median RNDP of the selected companies (“raw”) and that of the control group 
(“base”) is noticeable for a given time period before credit migration. 
The even more significant difference for non-investment grade bonds indicates that 
the structural models may work better for junk bonds, which is in line with Jones et al 
(1984), that the Merton model does provide incremental explanatory power for 
pricing riskier debts. Huang and Huang (2003) have similar conclusion that credit risk 
could explain a larger proportion of yield spread for junk bonds. To be more specific, 
Delainedis and Geske (2003) present that, with the Merton model for example, for the 
investment grade bonds, 17 months prior to bonds being re-rated, such difference is 
significant at both the 95% and 99% level. Among the investment grade bonds, the 
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event that possesses least detectable information is that the firm experience more than 
2 rating categories upgrading. The raw RNDP for non-investment grade bonds, 24 
months and 1 month prior to the event, are 14% and 62.4% respectively, which are 
significant. Even for the non-investment grade bonds with no previous history of 
downgrading, it transpires that the 99% significance level arrives at 18 months prior 
to credit migration. 
Ogden (1987) also finds evidence that such inputs as asset volatility and leverage 
could explain 78.6% of the variation of agency bond ratings and could also correctly 
classify 61.4% bonds into the corresponding ratings. The sample contains 57 callable 
and sinkable corporate bonds of the firms with simple capital structure, from 1973 to 
1985. With the sample data, Ogden (1987) shows that the modelled yield spread could 
explain approximately 60% of the observed market yield spread.  
The answers for the second question, however, are mixed. Jones et al. (1984, 1985) 
are the very first studies of the empirical validity of the Merton models. Jones et al. 
(1985) question the assumptions of the model and confirm the effects of personal tax, 
time-varying variance and asset dilution on pricing debts. They compute the monthly 
bond prices for 15 firms with the characteristics of simple capital structure, small 
portion of private and short-term debt from 1975 to 1981, and point out that the 
Merton model underprices the “safe” bonds with maturity shorter than 15 years but 
overprices the bonds with otherwise similar characters. Nevertheless, Fisher (1985) 
comments that the contingent claims model is originally constructed to price risky 
bonds not “safe” bonds and questions the methodology in Jones et al. (1985) that the 
variance might be correlated over time as they take the history volatility as the future 
implied volatility. 
With the growing body of literature in constructing various structural models, some 
studies focus on comparing the extent of accuracy to which the models are able to 
price risky bonds. Eom et al. (2004) examine 182 bond prices from non-financial firm 
in the period of 1986 till 1997 and concluded that the Merton model predicts too low 
credit spreads while other models, namely, Geske (1977), Longstaff and Schwartz 
(1995), Leland and Toft (1996), Collin-Dufersne and Goldstein (2001), overestimate 
the credit spreads.  
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Overall, the empirical results of the prediction accuracy are not satisfying. Schaefer 
and Strebulaev (2008) infer two possible reasons for the failure of the models. One 
would be the oversimplification of the long-term financial policies of the companies. 
The other is that the bond prices may be affected by non-credit issues that are not 
considered in the models. Such questioning about missing factors is also implied by 
the large and significant intercept in regression analysis of observed market yield 
spreads against the bond yield spreads (Ogden 1987).  
This leads to the third question and answers to it are indeed what trigger the 
development and evolution of the structural models. 
Both Jones et al. (1984) and Ogden (1987) suggest that the contingent claims models 
should incorporate some intuition of interest rates to replicate the risk-free bond prices 
and reflect the risk premium. Nonetheless, Lyden and Seraniti (2001) find proofs that 
the stochastic interest rate accounts for a very limited portion of the prediction 
accuracy. One possible explanation is that both Jones et al. (1984) and Ogden (1987) 
choose a period with high interest rate volatility and thus the interest rate variation 
may appear to be influential. Eom et al. (2004) shows that the problem of inaccuracy 
in the Lonstaff and Schwartz model, the Leland and Toft model and the Collin-
Dufersne and Goldstein model is actually worsened by incorporating bankruptcy cost 
and stochastic interest rates. 
Ogden (1987) proposes the firm size could be an additional input of the structural 
models. Once the firm size is added, when the default risk measures derived from the 
model are controlled for, the explanatory power to bond ratings variation raises to 
85.5%. 
Raised by Jones et al. (1984) and supported by Lyden and Seraniti (2001), personal 
tax and time-to-maturity could be the missing variables of the models. Qi et al (2010) 
construct a model and argue that the predictive accuracy could be enhanced by taking 
personal tax and liquidity factors into consideration of pricing debts. Regarding the 
maturity effect, Huang and Huang (2003) find also that the credit risk can explain a 
smaller fraction of credit spread for investment grade bonds with shorter maturities. 
To the contrary, by holding volatility and leverage constant, Eom et al. (2004) claim 
that maturity contains no extra information for estimating the spreads. 
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The results and conclusions of the empirical tests are mixed, largely due to differences 
in the selected period and the choices of proxy. Credit risk premium could explain 
yield spread to some extent, but the question is whether the chosen proxies are 
empirically verified. Missing factors may also account for the inaccuracy of the 
structural models. 
2.4 Other Bankruptcy Prediction Models  
2.4.1 The Accounting Information Based Models 
Using accounting information and financial ratios to predict bankruptcy has long been 
extensively studied. Academics employ various statistical tools to explore and 
construct models to classify failed companies and non-failed companies. 
By applying univariate regressions to study default probability and financial ratios the 
rationale of univariate models is to compare the statistically significant financial ratios 
and then specify a cut-off point of the two classes of firms. Adopting this idea, Beaver 
(1966) constructed a cash flow model to measure the default probability. Later Beaver 
(1968) found out that using the stock market price data could predict bankruptcy 
sooner. 
Another statistical approach using accounting information is the multivariate model, 
in which several independent variables are combined. Altman (1968) employs 
multivariate discriminate analysis and proposes an index of five financial ratios, 
which is called the Z-score. Arguing that the previous studies are based on data from 
already bankrupted companies and thus overstated the accuracy, Ohlson (1980) 
employs the conditional logit model and proposes another model to compute the so-
called O-score with another set of variables. These two models are so far the most 
popular ones in empirical studies. Generally these multivariate predictive models 
outperform the previous univariate models. 
Critics question the methodology of the multivariate models, arguing that there is no 
theoretical foundation for way the models were constructed, which is, starting with 
large numbers of candidate variables and then scaling down to the considerably 
significant ones. Zmijewki (1984) argues that the extremely low percentage of 
bankrupted firms relative to active firms and the unavailability of data after the firm 
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bankrupts would be two questionable methodological issues in these models. The 
generalizability of the models is also a problem. Grice and Ingram (2001) test the 
generalizability of Altman‟s model and find it to be of less predictive power in 
forecasting bankruptcy when using recent data and for non-manufacturing companies.  
Comparing the usefulness of several bankruptcy models, Hillegeist et al. (2004) 
conclude that the Black-Scholes-Merton Probability model derived from the Black-
Scholes-Merton option-pricing model provided significantly (at the 1% level) more 
information about default probability than any of the accounting-based models. Wu et 
al. (2011) find similar conclusions when they include more bankruptcy prediction 
models in their study. Hillegeist et al. (2004) and Altman and Sauders (1998) point 
out several disadvantages of the accounting-based measures in comparison of 
structural models: a) the probability of bankruptcy is forward-looking while 
accounting information is measures of past performance; b) they fail to incorporate 
the asset volatility; and c) accounting information could only be obtained periodically 
while the structural models could be implemented at any point of time. 
2.4.2 Other Models of Credit Risk Measurement  
Whilst many empirical tests find it difficult to estimate the non-observable parameters 
of the firm value in the implementation of the structural-form models, the reduced-
form models are another family of structural models that attempt to tackle this issue. 
Rather than conditioning default explicitly onto the value of firm and structuring the 
firm value as a stochastic process, the reduced-form models consider default as a rare 
event, which is modelled as Poisson process. 
Generally speaking, the credit spread calculated from the reduced-form models 
overstated the credit risk and hence may not provide direct measure of default 
probability. However, in the region where there is an active bond-trading market, the 
reduced-form models are widely adopted, given that the reduced-form models are 
fundamentally market-based models. 
Despite the fact that the reduced-form models require fewer parameters, the 
theoretical foundation of these models are questionable, in that the reduced-form 
models fail to show where the risk comes from. Unlike reduced-form models, the 
structural-form models are able to evolve based on economic reasoning. Secondly, the 
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time-varying parameters would cut the validity of the reduced-form models down to a 
relatively short time period. A third criticism of the reduced-form models is lacking of 
mathematical trackablity. 
Different from the models mentioned above, the Gambler‟s ruin model is a structural 
model that applies a gambling hypothesis to the case of company, and calculates the 
distance to default relying on the information of cash flow. To be more specific, 
Wilcox (1971) treats the equity as initial stake and the cash flow as having either 
positive and negative states, and then investigates the probability of losing the initial 
stake after certain number of games. The distance to default presents the risk as a 
function of value and volatility, which is calculated as the sum of equity and cash 
flow, divided by the cash flow volatility. 
The Wilcox‟s gambler‟s ruin model is little known and less studied, as it 
problematically presumes that the company is isolated from the financial market, and 
thus could only partly explain corporate failure and business risk. 
Moreover, with the development of mathematical approach and computational science, 
more powerful statistical tools are employed in the prediction of company failure. The 
hybrid models are the ones that apply data mining techniques in the computation of 
probability of bankruptcy. There is extensive literature regarding the construction of 
hybrid models involving such techniques as decision trees, neutral networks, genetic 
algorithm, support vector machine and so forth. Most of the studies that empirically 
test the hybrid models show higher predictive power in hybrid models than in 
accounting-based models.  
3. Data and Sample Selection: Thomas Cook Group plc 
3.1 Descriptive Analysis  
Thomas Cook Group plc (TCG) is a travel agency company which is created in 2007 
after a merger of Thomas Cook AG and MyTravel and is a constituent of FTSE 250. 
Its products are divided into three categories, namely, pre-packaged holidays, travel-
related financial service and independent travel. Its core strategy is to maximize the 




TCG mainly operates in six geographic segments, which are all within the area of 
Europe and North America. Thus, during the recent financial crisis, TCG has suffered 
from huge turmoil and large losses because people are less willing to spend on 
holidays and other leisure activities. The ongoing uncertainty of global economy 
negatively impacts the international tourism industry. This reveals the fact that the 
tourism and travel industry is rather cyclical.  
During the post financial crisis period, TCG changes the management team from top 
and adopt a series of plans to reduce cost and enhance profitability. In the financial 
year 2011 (FY2011)
3
, TCG suffers huge goodwill impairment and asset write-downs. 
Also, TCG proposes a reconstruction plan for the UK segment, of which the 
expenditure contributes to the significant loss in the first quarter of FY2012. TCG 
then reduces net debt by selling some of the business and eases financial burden by 
renegotiations of maturity extension.  
Before 2013, TCG has two bond issues, one is a 5-year 6.75%-coupon straight bond 
issued in 2010 with face value of €400 million
4
 and the other is a 7-year 7.75%-
coupon bond that matures in 2017 with face value of £300 million. On the first half-
year of FY2013, TCG announces capital refinancing, which includes £425 million 
equity injection, £175 million net debt reduction and other debt renegotiations. On 
May 2013, the company issue £441 unsecured senior notes to replace some of the old 
bonds. 
3.2 Financial Analysis 
Panel A of Table 1 is the DuPont financial analysis of TCG. The profitability 
measured by return on equity (ROE) is decreasing year by year. The profit margin 
drops 4.5% to -3.08% for 2011. This negative profit margin, together with the huge 
jumps in tax burden and interest burden because of such loss, results in a negative 
ROE of -45%. In 2012, resulting from further declined equity to asset ratio, ROE is 
surprisingly -135.73%, indicating that TCG is in serious financial distress. 
  
                                                 
3
 The accounting reference date of TCG is 30 September of each calendar year. 
4





Using 5-year historic data from financial statements and the financial market, these 
accounting ratios are selected and classified into different groups for different purpose. The 
data was from Thomson ONE banker. 
*Profit margin = Earnings before tax and interest / Total sales 
  Tax burden = Net income / Pre-tax income 
  Interest burden = Pre-tax income / Earnings before tax and interest 
  Asset Turnover = Sales / Average total assets 
  Equity multiplier = Total asset / Total common equity 
  Return on Equity = Net income / Average equity 
**The units for net cash flow from operating activities (CFO), net cash flow from financing 
activities (CFF) and net cash flow from investing activities (CFI) are millions of GBP (£M) 
and that for free cash flow per share is one unit of GBP (£). 
***EBIT is the earnings before interest and tax; and EBITDA is the earnings before interest, 
tax, depreciation and amortization.  
 
Cash flow analysis is an essential part in risk management and credit analysis. In 
panel B, the decreasing figures of net cash flow from operating and investing 
activities, as well as the cash flow to sales ratios indicate that the cash collection 
2012 2011 2010 2009 2008
Profit margin -3.76% -3.08% 1.49% 1.81% 1.67%
Tax burden 120.21% 128.19% -6.75% 26.38% 87.48%
Interest burden 136.41% 134.37% 29.14% 35.72% 37.57%
Asset turnover 1.57          1.52          1.35          1.39          1.46          
Equity multiplier 14.03         5.59          3.79          3.89          3.35          
Return on equity -135.73% -45.02% -0.15% 0.92% 2.68%
CFO (£M) 35.4 196.2 234.3 75.5 302.0
CFF (£M) 32.8 10.7 -139.5 -226.5 81.1
CFI (£M) -52.7 184.3 291.1 130 291.5
Free cash flow (£M) -94.2 -14.1 -21.5 -142.9 141.6
Free cash flow per share (£) -0.0689 -0.0813 0.0077 0.0101 0.0313
Cash flow to sales ratio 0.52          1.20          2.98          2.48          2.24          
Quick ratio 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.45
Current ratio 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.40 0.55
EBITDA/Interest expense -1.52 -1.30 3.37 3.45 4.88
EBIT/Interest expense -2.75 -2.91 1.41 1.45 2.08
Long-term debt/Equity 2.90 0.90 0.59 0.22 0.32
Total debt/Equity 3.07 1.07 0.67 0.72 0.59
Price-earnings ratio 1.80          1.30          8.30          8.70          7.30          
Price to book ratio 0.38          0.30          0.85          1.16          1.00          
Price to sales ratio 0.02          0.04          0.17          0.21          0.23          
Price to cash flow ratio 3.07          2.92          5.54          8.63          10.49         
Panel A: DuPont analysis*
Panel B: Cash flow analysis**
Panel C: Solvency analysis***
Panel D: Share price analysis
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ability of TCG is diminishing over the five-year period. The negative free cash flows 
since 2009 also imply that there is little distributable cash available to equity holders 
and debt holders. 
In panel C, both the quick ratios and current ratios are well below 0.5, meaning that 
the liquidity of TCG is problematic. In addition, the negative interest coverage ratios
5
 
in 2011 and 2012 imply that TCG might have to liquidize some of its assets to cover 
the interest payments. The leverage ratios suddenly jump in 2012, which is caused by 
the plumped equity value. 
In penal D of Table 1 are some valuation ratios. All ratios change dramatically in 
2011, a period when the stock price is at historically low level. The price-earnings 
ratio of 2009 is the highest but it is below 2 in the recent two years. These decreasing 
valuation ratios suggest that investors are passive towards the stock performance of 
TCG. 
3.3 Share Price Analysis 
Figure 1 
Relative Stock Price of TCG, the FTSE All Share and the FTSE 250  
Based on the stock price and price index values on 19 June 2007, which is the date when the 
merger between Thomas Cook AG and MyTravel completes, the relative prices are calculated 
and presented in percentage term in each dataset respectively. Data is extracted from 
Datastream and complied by author for the period from June 2007 to May 2013. 
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Market Value of TCG  
In 2007 after the merger of Thomas Cook AG and MyTravel, the market value of TCG 
inflates to over £3,000 million. The market value declines in the following period and is 
volatile at the level of £2,000 million. Then it falls sharply in 2011 and is below £250 million 
in 2012. Data is extracted from Datastream and complied by author for the period from 
January 2007 to May 2013. 
 
Judging from Figure 1 and 2, though TCG initially outperforms the market, its 
volatility is considerably more significant than the FTSE All Share and the FTSE 250. 
Even though the stock price starts to bounce back at the beginning of 2013, its current 
relative stock price is still below the level of the FTSE.  
Both the relative price level and market value start to drop significantly when 
Standard and Poor‟s (S&P) downgrades TCG to BB- with negative outlook, arguing 
that TCG might be unable to repay its debt upon maturity. With the speculation of 
worsening trading environment, S&P further lowers the long-term corporate rating to 
B on November 2011, causing the stock price drop to historical low level. On July 




TCG has announced dividend payments and share repurchases several times since 
2007, but two of the dividend announcements are omitted, in December 2011 and 
                                                 

















May 2012 respectively, which signals financial distress of TCG. TCG decides not to 
pay any dividend until the organizational restructuring is completed. 
3.4 Altman Z-scores 
Table 2 
Altman Z-score 
In this table, using the date extracted from Thomson ONE banker, the Altman Z-score for 
each financial year are computed. According to Altman (1968), companies are said to be in 
the “Safe” zones with Z-score larger than 2.99 and are in “Distress” zones with Z-score lower 
than 1.81. Between 1.81 and 2.99 lies the “Grey” zone. The unit for accounting data is 
millions of GBP (£M). 
*Z = 1.2T1 + 1.4T2 + 3.3T3 + 0.6T4 + 0.999T5 
 
Table 2 shows the computation of Altman‟s Z-score for TCG. Four out of the five 
selected period have Z-scores below 1.81, signalling that TCG is in financial distress 
during that period. The Z-score of 2010 was slightly higher but still remains in the 
grey zone. 
  
2012 2011 2010 2009 2008
Working capital (1) 87.00 -181.60 563.70 -816.30 -670.97
Retained earnings (2) 96.50 746.40 1357.30 1510.20 1719.60
EBIT (3) -357.30 -302.30 132.10 167.70 148.36
Market value of euqity (4) 155.03 349.03 1474.55 1993.81 2002.20
Book value of liability (5) 5244.20 5225.30 4774.70 4912.30 4680.60
Sales (6) 9491.20 9808.90 8890.10 9268.80 8909.57
Total asset (7) 5702.10 6408.50 6517.40 6639.50 6689.80
T1 = (1) / (7) 0.02 -0.03 0.09 -0.12 -0.10
T2 = (2) / (7) 0.02 0.12 0.21 0.23 0.26
T3 = (3) / (7) -0.06 -0.05 0.02 0.03 0.02
T4 = (4) / (5) 0.03 0.07 0.31 0.41 0.43
T5 = (6) / (7) 1.66 1.53 1.36 1.40 1.33
Z-score* 1.50          1.51          1.84          1.67          1.67          
Zone Distress Distress Grey Distress Distress
Panel B: Accounting ratios
Panel C: Altman Z-score
Panel A: Accounting data
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4. Calibration of the Models  
4.1 Methodology  
Table 3 
Acronyms 
This group of acronyms are needed for calibration of the structural models. In the following 
implementation, the subscript “1” stands for the bond issued in Euro and “2” is the bond 
issued in GBP. The subscript “M” stands for the values estimated in Merton model while L 
stands for that of Leland model. The risk-free rates, the market value of equity and bonds are 
extracted from Datastream. 
 
Acronym   Definition Explanation
Int Accrued interest Sum of the estimated coupon payments. Calculated as in equation (1).
c Coupon rate The weighted average coupon rate of bonds, where the weights are the 
proportions of each bond face value in the total amount.
B Market value of bonds Sum of the market value of the two bonds.
r Risk-free rate The rate of return of 10-year UK government bond.
T Time to maturity Calculated as in equation (9).
t Future time to maturity The time to maturity at a future point of time.
Div Accrued dividend Sum of the estimated dividend payments. Calculated as in equation (2).
Div0 Current dividend payment Assumed to be zero for TCG.
g Dividend growth rate Assumed to be zero for TCG.
E Observed equity value As observed from the market.
E(V) Modelled equity value Calculated as in equation (3).
V Estimated asset value Estimated by solving a system of equations.
σ Implied asset volatility Estimated by solving a system of equations.
σE Observed equity volatility The annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns. See footnote 8 for 
calculation detail.
σe Modelled equity volatility Calculated as in equation (4).
h Days to maturity Number of days remaining till the bond expires.
π Asset risk premium Calculated as in equation (12).
πE Equity risk premium Calculated as in equation (13).
πM Market risk premium Assumed to be 4.5% 
βE Equity beta The slope of excess equity returns and excess market returns
D Estimated bond value Calculated as in equation (14) and (24). 
DP Default probability Calculated as in equation (15) and (19). 
S credit spread Calculated as in equation (16) and (20). 
b Annual coupon payment Sum of the coupon rate times the face value of each bond, dominated in GBP.
Vb Bankruptcy threshold Calculated as in equation (17).
τ Tax rate Assumed to be 35%.
α Bankruptcy cost ratio Assumed to be 30%.
V(V) Modelled firm value The estimated firm value in Leland model, calculated as in equation (18).
TB Tax benefit Calculated as in equation (26).
BC Bankruptcy cost Calculated as in equation (27).
pBL probability of bankruptcy Calculated as in equation (18).
δ Asset payout ratio The weighted average of coupon rate and dividend payout ratio, calculated as in 
equation (22).
p dividend payout ratio Current dividend divided by equity value.
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4.1.1 Merton Model  
In the structural models, the debt value is the asset value of the firm deducted by the 
value of equity, which is structured as a call option. In the Merton model, this option 
has an exercise price of the current market values of the bonds, plus the accrued 
coupon and dividend payments
7
. The coupon and dividend payments are assumed to 
be deferred till the maturity of the bonds and thus their future values grow at the risk-
free rate. A list of acronyms is shown in Table 3. 
Int =   c ∗Tt B ∗ e
rt                                                                                                       (1) 
Div =   Div0(1 + g)
tT
t ∗ e
rt                                                                                         (2) 
Moreover, the spot price of the underlying asset of this “option” is the implied asset 
value and therefore in order to obtain the default probabilities and credit spreads, it is 
required to estimate the asset value, asset volatility and asset risk premium. 
E V =  VΦ d1 −   B + Int + Div e
−rT Φ d2 +  
Div
Div +Int
(V − VΦ k1 +
 Div + Int e−rT Φ k2 )                                                                                  (3) 
σe =  σ ∗ [Φ d1 +
Div
Div +Int
(1 − Φ k1 )] ∗
V
E
                                                                (4) 
where 
d1 =  
ln 
V
B  + Int  + Div
 + r + 
σ2
2
  ∗ T
σ T
                                                                                       (5) 




Div  + Int
 + r + 
σ2
2
  ∗ T
σ T
                                                                                            (7) 







∗ h2)/360                                                                            (9)  
                                                 
7
 Although TCG has declared dividend in the past, the payments are omitted and thus the initial 






− 1)2 + (
σe
σE
− 1)2                                                                         (10) 
By using Excel solver to solve the system of equation (3) and (4) with the objective to 
minimize equation (10)
 8
, the asset value and implied asset volatility are estimated. By 
minimizing the objective function the modelled asset value (V) and volatility (σe) 
could converge with the observed asset value and volatility (σE), and thus the solver 
values would be the implied V and σ.  







                                                                                                                         (11) 
By rearranging this relationship,  
π =
πE  ∗ σ
σE
                                                                                                                      (12) 
where 
πE = βE ∗ πM
9                                                                                                             (13) 
So far for the Merton model, inputs for the calculation of debt value (DM), default 
probabilities (DPM) and credit spreads (SM) are available. Thus,  
DM = V − E(V)                                                                                                           (14) 
DPM = Φ(d2 −
π T
σ







 − r                                                                                                  (16) 
                                                 
8
 σE = STD ∗  262, where STD is the standard deviation of daily stock returns calculated using the 
Excel function STDEV and 262 is the number of trading days. 
9
 The beta is computed as the slope of excess equity returns and excess FTSE 250 returns. Although the 
choice of market risk premium is debatable in existing studies, it is assumed to be 4.5%, which is 
widely chosen in empirical tests. 
22 
 
4.1.2 Leland Model 
For the Leland model, however, as bankruptcy cost and tax benefit are incorporated, 
and the firm is assumed to pay coupon into infinity, the securities of the firm is 
structured in a different way. Leland (1994) assumed that bankruptcy is actually 
determined by shareholders, when the going-concern value of the firm is lower than 
the firm value if default is executed. Therefore, a bankruptcy threshold (Vb) should be 
specified by equity holder, which is calculated as 
Vb =
 1−τ ∗ b




                                                                                                                (17) 
No model can be accurate and precisely fit into reality, especially when not all of the 
inputs of the model are directly observable in the market. Thus, the asset value, asset 
volatility and asset risk premium estimated in section 4.1.1 are taken as the ones for 
Leland model. 
If V is less than Vb, then the equity holders would declare bankruptcy; and if not, the 
possibility of shareholders declaring bankruptcy at the time of prediction is measured 
by the probability of bankruptcy (pBL). Additionally, the default probability (that the 







σ2                                                                                                              (18) 























− r                                                                                                               (20) 
where 
γ = π + r − δ −
1
2








∗ p                                                                                                       (22) 
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In addition, since Leland model structures firms in a different way, the estimated firm 
value V(V) is expressed as 





+   1 − 𝛼 𝑉𝑏 −
𝑏
𝑟
 ∗ 𝑝𝐵𝐿                                                                                (24) 
𝐸𝐿 =  𝑉 −  1 − 𝜏 
𝑏
𝑟
 +   1 − 𝜏 
𝑏
𝑟




(1 − 𝑝𝐵𝐿)                                                                                                     (26) 
𝐵𝐶 = 𝛼 ∗ 𝑉𝑏 ∗ 𝑝𝐵𝐿                                                                                                      (27) 
4.2. Sensitivity Analysis 
4.2.1 Hypothesis and Methodology 
Table 4 
Selected Variables and Hypothesis 
Column A is the list of selected variables and the predicted relations of the variables, and 
default probability and credit spread (signs) are in Column B in accordance with the previous 
literature review and economic reasoning. The assigned values to each variable in the base 
case of the sign test are in Column C.   
 
From 2010 to 2013, the business conditions of TCG change dramatically. Therefore it 
is necessary to conduct a sensitivity analysis to several crucial inputs of the models in 
order to analyze how the default risk reacts to such changes. The selected variables 
and predicted signs are presented in Table 4. Throughout the analysis, equity value, 
annual coupon payment, time to maturity, asset payout ratio and asset beta are 
constant, tailing to the specific situation of TCG. Then move each variable up or 
down once at a time so as to have a new default probability and credit spread, and 
calculated the percentage change. 
Variable Predicted sign Assigned value Additional prediction 
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Volatility (σE) + 100% Positively convex to credit spread
Leverage ratio (B/E) + 2
Risk-free rate (r) - 3%
Market risk premium (πM) - 4.5%
Tax rate (τ) - 40% Affect tax benefit and bankruptcy cost
Bankruptcy cost (α) + 30% Affect bankruptcy cost
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In addition to a simple sign test, differences in the percentage trigger further 
investigation. Reducing the interval of changes, a more precise relationship between 
the variable and credit spread is illustrated by plotting the variable against credit 
spread.  
4.2.2 Results  
Table 5 
Sensitivity Analysis 
In the computation of new estimates, except for the selected variable and specified changes, 
other inputs and variables stay constant as in the base case. The methodology is the same as 
described in section 4.1. The percentile number shown under the new estimates is the 
percentage change of the dependent variable compared to the original one in base case. If 
specify, the unit is million of GBP (£M). 
 
In Table 5, it is clear that equity volatility is positively related to default probability 
and credit spread. The economic reasoning is that as the asset volatility implied by 
50% 75% 125% 150% 1 1.5 2.5 3
DPM 0.9025   0.7562     0.8446     0.9414     0.9666     0.8461     0.8832     0.9206     0.9315     
-16.21% -6.41% 4.32% 7.11% -6.24% -2.13% 2.01% 3.22%
SM 0.4909   0.2925     0.3926     0.5959     0.7104     0.4044     0.4557     0.5273     0.5548     
-40.41% -20.04% 21.38% 44.71% -17.64% -7.18% 7.40% 13.01%
pBL 0.8164   0.5835     0.7318     0.8677     0.9002     0.8748     0.8742     0.8743     0.8747     
-28.53% -10.36% 6.29% 10.27% 7.15% 7.08% 7.10% 7.14%
SL 0.1163   0.0344     0.0697     0.1744     0.2425     0.1218     0.1213     0.1217     0.1222     
-70.46% -40.11% 49.90% 108.47% 4.74% 4.28% 4.61% 5.02%
2% 2.5% 3.5% 4% 3% 4% 5% 6%
DPM 0.9025   0.9055     0.9040     0.9009     0.8993     0.9096     0.9049     0.9000     0.8950     
0.34% 0.17% -0.17% -0.35% 0.79% 0.27% -0.27% -0.83%
SM 0.4909   0.4950     0.4930     0.4889     0.4870     0.4909     0.4909     0.4909     0.4909     
0.83% 0.41% -0.41% -0.81% 0% 0% 0% 0%
pBL 0.8164   0.8741     0.8448     0.7888     0.7619     0.8164     0.8164     0.8164     0.8164     
7.07% 3.49% -3.38% -6.67% 0% 0% 0% 0%
SL 0.1163   0.1214     0.1188     0.1139     0.1114     0.1163     0.1163     0.1163     0.1163     
4.33% 2.15% -2.12% -4.21% 0% 0% 0% 0%
30% 35% 45% 50% 20% 25% 35% 40%
pBL 0.8164   0.8248     0.8207     0.8117     0.8065     0.8164     0.8164     0.8164     0.8164     
1.03% 0.53% -0.58% -1.21% 0% 0% 0% 0%
DPL 0.4382   0.4720     0.4557     0.4195     0.3993     0.4382     0.4382     0.4382     0.4382     
7.72% 3.99% -4.28% -8.89% 0% 0% 0% 0%
SL 0.1163   0.1197     0.1181     0.1143     0.1121     0.1142     0.1152     0.1174     0.1185     
2.89% 1.53% -1.71% -3.62% -1.85% -0.93% 0.95% 1.91%
Vb （£M) 57.29     66.84       62.06       52.52       47.74       57.29       57.29       57.29       57.29       
16.67% 8.33% -8.33% -16.67% 0% 0% 0% 0%
DL（£M) 313.49   306.46     309.73     317.80     322.77     318.17     315.83     311.15     308.81     
-2.24% -1.20% 1.38% 2.96% 1.49% 0.75% -0.75% -1.49%
EL（£M) 989.36   961.94     975.49     1,003.57  1,018.16  989.36     989.36     989.36     989.36     
-2.77% -1.40% 1.44% 2.91% 0% 0% 0% 0%
TB（£M) 112.30   80.36       95.93       129.58     147.91     112.30     112.30     112.30     112.30     
-28.44% -14.58% 15.39% 31.71% 0% 0% 0% 0%
BC（£M) 14.03     16.54       15.28       12.79       11.55       9.35         11.69       16.37       18.71       







equity volatility becomes higher, the higher the uncertainty of TCG failing to repay 
debt, and thus the default probability increases and investors would ask for more 
compensation for bearing such risk. Moreover, although it is hypothesized that 
volatility is positively convex against credit spread, in Figure 3 and 4 it seems that for 
Figure 3 
Volatility against Credit Spread in the Merton Model 
Holding other inputs constant, the credit spread is calculated by moving the equity volatility 
10% at a time stating from 30% till 200%. The relationship is almost linear. 
 
Figure 4 
Volatility against Credit Spread in the Leland Model 
Similar with Figure 3, the interval of changes is 10%. The relationship between equity 























TCG the relationship of volatility and credit spread is not obviously convex, and is 
almost linear in the Merton model.   
Figure 5 
Leverage against Credit Spread in Merton model 
The interval of changes in debt-to-equity ratio (B/E ratio) is 0.25 from 0.5 to 3.5. The 
relationship between leverage ratio and SM is positive as predicted. 
 
Figure 6 
Leverage against Credit Spread in Leland model 
Similar with Figure 5, SL is calculated by moving the B/E ratio 0.25 at a time. The 
relationship is U-shaped, meaning that under the assumptions of Leland model, the credit 
























The most interesting finding lies in the analysis of leverage ratio. Illustrated in Figure 
5, leverage ratio is positively associated with SM; whereas in Figure 6 the relationship 
between B/E ratio and SL is U-shaped, which explains why in Table 5 the percentage 
changes of pBL and SL with B/E ratio are both positive in either direction of changes.  
Since tax benefit and bankruptcy cost are incorporated into the Leland model, it is 
possible that there exist an optimal capital structure that could minimize the credit 
spread. For TCG, the optimal leverage ratio lies in the range of 1.5 to 2. 
The risk-free rate is negatively related to default probability and credit spread in both 
models, which is also in line with previous literature. The relationships between r and 
the default probability and credit spread are linear, which is confirmed in Figure 7 and 
8. Besides, the steeper slope of SL demonstrates that the Leland model is more 
sensitive to a change in risk-free rate. Notice that both SM and SL are considerably 
higher than the presumed r. As a result, it may be that for TCG, especially with 
Merton model, the variation of risk-free rate is not a major determinant in accessing 
credit risk. 
Judging from the percentage changes in Table 5, the choice of market risk premium 
only affects the levels of DPM, and the influence is minor. Although the equity 
premium of companies with B-rated bonds is suggested to be 8.76% in Huang and 
Huang (2003), it is calculated using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) in this 
paper. Thus it is more likely that the equity premium and default probability are 
subjected to the riskiness (beta) of the securities. 
As predicted, the tax rate is negatively associated with default probability and credit 
spread in the Leland model, suggesting the tax effect. Normally holding the debt level 
constant, a higher tax rate may help the company further exploit the tax benefit and 
thus would raise the total firm value and lower the bankruptcy threshold Vb. However 
for TCG, the effective tax rate increases mainly caused by low profit level. Hence, the 
tax benefit would be counterbalanced by the effect of weakening profitability. 
Shown in Table 5, the bankruptcy cost ratio, nonetheless, seems to have minor impact 
onto the assessment of credit risk in this sensitivity analysis. The linear relationship 
between α and DL is straightforward in equation (24), and thus it would affect the 
credit spread. With respect to the economic reasoning, it may be that bankruptcy cost 
is a factor of estimated firm value V(V), and affects the asset level once the firm is 
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pushed to debt holders. Hence, α may play a role in valuation but not in accessing 
credit risk. 
Figure 7 
Risk-free Rate against Credit Spread in the Merton Model 
In the Merton model, the relationship of r and SM is negative as forecasted, and is linear. 
 
Figure 8 
Risk-free Rate against Credit Spread in the Leland Model 
SL is also negatively related to r. Additionally, the range of variation in SL is larger than that 






















4.3 Empirical findings 
Table 6 
 Merton Model  
The default probabilities and credit spreads are calculated on a monthly basis, using the data 
of 262 trading days before the date of estimation. The date of estimation is the business day 
that is closest to and before 21
st
 of each calendar month from April 2011 to April 2013. The 
unit for V and DM is million of GBP. 
Note that the market capitalization of TCG suddenly dropped below £750 million in the 
middle of July 2011 and remained below 300 million from November 2011 till the end of 
2012. Since the estimations use the stock values of 262 trading days prior to the date of 
prediction, this period of recession accounts for the sudden increases in asset volatilities and 
declines in asset values, resulting in high levels of default probabilities and credit spreads. 
 
The results for Merton model are shown in Table 6. Initially from April to June 2011 
the estimated bond value is higher than the face value of issued bonds and thus the 
predicted probabilities of default are low and the credit spreads are approximately or 
below 0.1%. Since July 2011 the implied asset volatilities have increased, resulting in 
increasing default probabilities and the credit spreads. Affected by the depression in 
the market and declining profit level, the stock prices for TCG suddenly decreases to 
Date          σ     V     DM        DPM       SM
21/04/2011 21.31% 2,204.26        786.36           1.32% 0.11%
20/05/2011 18.32% 2,101.82        808.37           0.74% 0.05%
21/06/2011 17.22% 1,928.06        807.99           0.81% 0.06%
21/07/2011 23.44% 1,308.58        724.94           14.94% 1.14%
19/08/2011 26.78% 1,019.55        624.58           26.13% 2.51%
21/09/2011 33.52% 865.68           501.51           34.97% 4.01%
21/10/2011 39.06% 973.24           522.62           39.05% 5.08%
21/11/2011 38.52% 868.25           508.54           44.56% 5.95%
21/12/2011 152.19% 140.63           20.32             96.72% 59.17%
20/01/2012 152.29% 154.62           23.37             96.81% 60.18%
21/02/2012 151.71% 135.56           21.81             96.88% 60.97%
21/03/2012 161.43% 233.41           27.79             97.02% 63.26%
20/04/2012 162.22% 227.47           26.22             96.90% 62.97%
21/05/2012 162.42% 170.34           21.59             97.18% 65.36%
21/06/2012 164.32% 164.12           19.75             97.09% 65.71%
20/07/2012 159.91% 169.12           22.56             96.67% 63.31%
21/08/2012 156.23% 188.22           27.14             96.32% 61.11%
21/09/2012 151.61% 188.60           32.33             96.23% 60.69%
19/10/2012 150.07% 210.98           38.23             96.10% 60.39%
21/11/2012 46.57% 528.15           336.59           65.09% 11.06%
21/12/2012 41.66% 950.17           549.24           49.53% 6.71%
21/01/2013 44.08% 1,086.81        582.91           46.93% 6.56%
21/02/2013 47.94% 1,503.81        664.86           39.37% 5.56%
21/03/2013 45.86% 1,762.37        744.55           32.30% 4.37%
19/04/2013 46.89% 1,796.60        691.46           27.09% 3.84%
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60p in July 2011, which dramatically raises the asset volatility to over 150%. The 
default probabilities and credit spreads for December 2011 to October 2012 remain as 
high as 97% and over 60% respectively. Indeed, despite some organizational changes 
since 2011, the capital refinancing at the beginning of 2013 is considered to be a 
default event, meaning that the Merton model successfully anticipate default. After 
business reconstruction and recapitalization, the financial health of TCG is gradually 




Consistent with Table 6, the estimates are presented on a monthly basis. Additionally, the 
jumps in the market value of equity may account for the sudden plumps in the value of 
bankruptcy threshold and thus largely inflate the default probabilities and credit spreads. The 
units for Vb and DL are million of GBP. 
 
Date Vb DL pBL DPL SL
21/04/2011 512.62           1,197.79        10.25% 0.15% 0.28%
20/05/2011 591.74           1,289.96        7.91% 0.12% 0.20%
21/06/2011 632.72           1,334.11        8.84% 0.24% 0.21%
21/07/2011 509.31           1,091.21        34.42% 8.40% 1.10%
19/08/2011 502.61           945.77           62.96% 28.39% 2.50%
21/09/2011 382.93           767.01           72.98% 34.55% 3.81%
21/10/2011 293.29           732.50           67.12% 22.73% 3.73%
21/11/2011 310.00           708.67           73.71% 30.91% 4.27%
21/12/2011 25.29             84.09             96.99% 94.55% 52.48%
20/01/2012 25.25             87.61             96.76% 93.92% 50.24%
21/02/2012 25.42             82.89             96.83% 94.44% 53.12%
21/03/2012 22.49             95.81             95.97% 92.57% 45.59%
20/04/2012 22.31             94.53             96.39% 92.76% 46.44%
21/05/2012 22.30             84.94             97.31% 94.17% 52.23%
21/06/2012 21.82             82.64             97.60% 94.41% 53.88%
20/07/2012 23.07             86.49             97.82% 93.64% 51.62%
21/08/2012 24.09             92.55             97.17% 92.46% 47.86%
21/09/2012 25.58             96.00             97.16% 91.63% 46.12%
19/10/2012 26.04             101.34           96.55% 90.31% 43.37%
21/11/2012 234.80           463.29           87.05% 56.97% 8.05%
21/12/2012 281.96           715.34           76.69% 26.35% 4.52%
21/01/2013 253.17           721.80           73.40% 18.88% 4.29%
21/02/2013 219.15           755.00           70.17% 9.49% 3.96%
21/03/2013 240.77           849.74           70.21% 6.06% 3.53%
19/04/2013 235.36           850.28           73.40% 5.43% 3.72%
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Table 7 shows the Leland model results. pBL measures the probability of equity 
holders declaring bankruptcy prior to maturity, which is also a discounting factor in 
estimating the value of debt, equity, tax benefit and bankruptcy cost. Even though in 
Leland model the liabilities of firms are treated as perpetual bonds with fixed coupon 
payments, the default probabilities (DPL), of which the definition is comparable to 
that in the Merton model, are also presented.  
Overall the Leland model demonstrates similar patterns and trends with the Merton 
model. Both pBL and DPL are low from April to June 2011 but increase during the 
following quarter and reach the peak in the middle of 2012. After November 2012 the 
DPL drops down to below 10% while pBL slightly fluctuates around 70%. The credit 
spreads have same pattern of the default probabilities, that is, the spreads are low 
when the possibilities are low and also change dramatically when there are sudden 
jumps in asset values. This supports that the Leland model can also provides useful 
information for default forecast. 
Notice that in Table 7 the Vb on November 2012 is almost 10 times of the previous 
month. Also, the implied asset values V in Table 6 bounce back at the beginning of 
FY2013. Indeed, this is when TCG continues to lower net debt and has the equity 
injection and new bond issue fully underwritten. The market data and modelled 
statistics reflect such information.  
4.4 Comparative analysis  
Figure 9 shows that DPM, DPL and pBL generally share the same trend. In terms of 
levels, DPL is lower than DPM and pBL is highest of all. This indicates that in 
financially distressed firms like TCG, it is the owners rather than the creditors who 
have a higher incentive to vote for bankruptcy. Hence, such a gap is reasonable owing 
to the different underlying assumptions. Nevertheless, these results prove that both 
Merton model and Leland model are successful in terms of predicting bankruptcy and 
accessing default possibilities, which is line with the previous empirical findings. 
Figure 10 compares the predicted credit spreads calculated in the two models. 
Interestingly, SM is lower than SL from April to August 2011, when the firm is 
financially healthier and the risk-free rate is higher, but higher than SL since then as 
the implied asset volatilities are larger than 30% and the risk-free rate is decreasing. 
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This suggests that in this case Merton model would underprice credit risks for safe 
bonds but would overestimate the spreads for risky bonds comparing to Leland model. 
Figure 9 
The Default Probabilities of the Models 
The monthly default probabilities DPM, DPL and pBL are plotted in the chart. All of the three 
are high and approaching 100% from December 2011 to October 2012, but vary in other 
periods. pBL remains the highest of three. On the other hand, DPM is higher relative to DPL 
and the spread is larger in the periods with relatively lower asset volatilities. 
 
Figure 10 

























From December 2011 to October 2010, the estimated credit spreads in both models is 
high above 50%, which is very unlikely to encounter in reality. A large-sample test is 
more sensible and reasonable in testing the accuracy of the models in calculating 
credit spreads, whereas in this paper TCG is treated as a stand-alone case. Such high 
credit spreads are indicators of default, which does occur in the form of debt write-
down. 
Figure 11 
The Estimated Debt Values and the Market Value of Bonds 
Both the estimated debt value of the two models DM and DL are compared with the observed 
bond values in the market (B) during the period of estimation. The unit is million of GBP. 
 
In Figure 11, roughly DM and DL have the same trend with B, but the actual values 
vary overtime. This is also consistent with Figure 10, that is, the estimated bond value 
is negatively associated with default probability. Both the models overprice the bonds 
prior to September 2011 when TCG is still rated BB-, but then when TCG is in 
serious crisis, both models illustrate that the bonds are worthless and far below the 
market value. When TCG stars to recover but remains unstable after October 2012, 
DL is again above B while DM is the opposite. 
It is obvious that DL is above DM at all times, i.e. the Leland model overestimates 
bond prices relative to the Merton model, which is constant with previous empirical 
tests. This, together with Figure 10, suggests that the wider the credit spread is the 
















A major focus of this paper is to assess credit risk of a public company using 
structural models. From the perspective of investors, estimating the credit risks and 
credit spreads of the target company is part of the decision making process of 
investments and risk management. For companies, structuring securities into suitably 
trackable models is also helpful in making financial decisions. 
Initiated by Merton (1974), enormous literature is created to either modify the 
contingent claims models or empirically examine the validity of these models. Overall 
in the previous studies, the structural models are successful in raising signals for 
default or credit migration, but fail to accurately price the bonds and estimate credit 
spreads.  
Among all the structural models, the Merton model (1974) and the Leland model 
(1994) are selected to compute the bankruptcy probability of a chosen public 
company with non-investment grade bonds, Thomas Cook Group plc (TCG). The 
predicted default probabilities in both models are high when the firm is experiencing 
volatile asset returns and low profitability. Both models successfully predict default, 
which is in the form of debt restructuring. A prior accounting-based financial analysis 
also suggests that TCG is in financial distress, supporting the conclusions drawn from 
the implementation of the models.  
The default probability estimated in the Merton model (DPM) is higher than that in the 
Leland model (DPL) when the credit risk of TCG is low but becomes lower when the 
firm appears to be more risky. But DPM is smaller than the probability of bankruptcy 
estimated in the Leland model (pBL) when the firm is relatively safer, and 
approximately the same when TCG is closed to bankruptcy. This is reasonable as the 
shareholders of the companies with junk bonds would have more incentive to default.  
Contrary to the findings of default probability, the credit spreads predicted in the 
Merton model (SM) is lower than that in the Leland model (SL) when TCG is rather 
financially healthy in the early periods, but later the Merton model overestimates the 
credit spreads relative to Leland model when the implied asset volatilities are above 
30%. Moreover, the bond value level estimated in the Merton model is consistently 
lower than that of the Leland model. 
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Furthermore, a sensitivity analysis of several inputs of the models shows that most of 
the relationships between the variables and default probability as well as credit spread 
are in line with the prior empirical findings. In the analysis of leverage ratio, it is 
suggested that there is an optimal capital structure that could minimize the credit 
spread. 
To sum up, taking TCG as an illustration, both the Merton model and the Leland 
model are able to forecast bankruptcy for public companies with traded and risky 
bonds, but the results for credit spread are mixed and thus call for further study. 
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